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1 David B. Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in Immigration Law, 38 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 393, 395 (2010) (analyzing the myths surrounding the treatment of children under U.S. immigration law and noting how immigration law marginalizes children by failing to recognize them as individuals with independent rights and interests). 2 The names and other identifying information of children in this article have been changed to protect their identities.
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[Vol. 15:189 looks over at me, smiling, as I sit next to her, trying my best to hide my desperation in seeking another adjournment to advocate against her removal. In reflecting on these experiences and how the process seems to obscure and hide the complete lives of children and youth, this Article will explore the history of how these children came to be in deportation proceedings, the struggle for and limitations of key due process rights for children and youth during apprehension and while in deportation proceedings, and the use of prosecutorial discretion as a tool to protect children and youth in the face of limited due process rights or substantive legal relief. In particular, this exploration, together with recent experiences in the use of prosecutorial discretion, has led this practitioner back to the most fundamental aspect of due process in the deportation system: the right of children and youth to be meaningfully heard. For example, in representing Luis, efforts had been focused on seeking asylum, withholding of removal, convention against torture, and derivative temporary protected status. However, facing a difficult asylum hearing in late summer and the advent of the newly published guidance on prosecutorial discretion, the representation demanded ensuring that the immigration system know the entirety of Luis's life and not just those facts that directly related to the substantive forms of relief. As a result, we submitted an extensive prosecutorial discretion letter of request. The ultimate grant of asylum to Luis in late summer was a revelation and a great cause of celebration. Indeed, what it meant for me is that this right to be meaningfully heard was the most critical tool in my advocacy for children like Luis and Katherine. It demonstrated to me that irrespective of whether I, as the attorney representing the child or young person in a deportation proceeding, believe that the child can pursue legal relief or was subjected to a due process violation, that I should, as attorney for the child, be a zealous advocate, and ensure that the child has the opportunity to present all facts regarding his or her personal history, present circumstances, and long-term safety and well-being. This creates greater accountability for attorneys representing children and youth. This also forces the immigration system to listen to the voices of children and young people in a humanizing way that gives rise to the possibility, however limited, of discretion being exercised in favor of the child. Most importantly, this process of being meaningfully heard empowers children themselves in the immigration court so that they do not feel shuffled through the immigration system or live under a tyranny of silence fearing to speak out and tell their stories. Until the early 1990s, children who were apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were often returned to their countries of origin under a voluntary departure system and rarely appeared in exclusion hearings. 3 This was because the then-INS procedures for apprehending children involved offering the child the right to waive their right to an exclusion hearing and choose voluntary departure. 4 Under Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, the waiver of this right had to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
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5
Advocates argued that children were not in a position to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive these rights because of their lack of language skills, cultural understanding of rights, and cognitive and developmental challenges. 6 In the 1980s and 1990s, advocates litigated a range of due process rights for children in deportation proceedings, as well as custody conditions for children, and scholars devoted journal articles to the due process implications of children being removed without access to hearings.
7 Scholars and advocates alike argued that be- 8 In the course of the deportation hearing, the child must have a reasonable opportunity to be present, a reasonable notice of the charges, a right to: be represented by counsel, present evidence, cross examine witnesses, and examine and object to evidence offered by the prosecutor.
9 By ensuring that children have a mandatory right to a deportation hearing, scholars and advocates noted that the children would then not be able to simply waive their rights to seek relief from removal, but would also be able to seek possible forms of lawful status that would conform with due process of law. 13 children are now almost entirely certain to enter the deportation hearing process as called for by advocates and scholars decades ago. Now, the struggle has moved to the notice of rights that attach upon apprehension, service, admissions of removability, competency, and the right to counsel. The way in which advocates have begun litigating these various due process rights that have emerged since children have achieved the right to a deportation hearing will be briefly explored below.
B. Procedural Due Process Rights in the Removal Proceeding
Apprehension and the Form I-770 Notice of Rights,
Interrogation, and the Issuance of the Notice to Appear
One of the fundamental rights that attach when children are apprehended by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a requirement to provide them with a Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition through Form I-770.
14 The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations requires that all apprehended children must be given the Form I-770. 15 If the child is less than 14 years of age or unable to understand the notice, the notice must be read and explained to the child in a language he or she understands.
16
Pursuant to this regulation, the current version of the Form I-770, Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition (Form I-770 Notice of Rights), requires that the arresting officer explain three basic rights to the apprehended child: the right to use the telephone to call a parent, adult relative or adult friend; the right to be represented by an attorney who can fully explain the child's rights; and the right to a hearing before the immigration judge who will decide whether you must leave or whether you may stay in the United States. 17 Apart from the content of the form, this regulatory requirement also states that the rights must be explained to the child in a language he or she "understands" in order to waive rights. 18 The Form I-770 Notice of Rights is usually provided to the child at the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol station, often after traumatic journeys and experiences of apprehension, in a confined space that children often refer to as uncomfortable, cold, and coercive. 20 The analysis should include an evaluation of whether the child has sufficiently understood the information received about the remedy or right involved, engaged in rational decision making, and accepted the remedy or waived the right of his or her own volition. In addition, the ABA Standards commentary encourages a Miranda-styled totality of the circumstances analysis by the adjudicator who must question the child about the child's intent to be removed, specifically focused on these five concepts: the child understands the nature of the proceedings; the child understands his legal rights; the child understands the consequences of the proposed remedy; the child accepts the proposed remedy; and the child's acceptance is truly voluntary.
21
Advocates around the country have litigated on a case-by-case basis whether ICE has met the requirement of providing the Form I-770 Notice of Rights to the apprehended child or whether there was a valid waiver of the rights contained in the Form I-770 Notice of Rights prior to being interrogated by ICE. In particular, attorneys have argued that the failure to provide a Form I-770 Notice of Rights is grounds for a motion to terminate deportation proceedings and suppress statements made during any interrogation by ICE.
22 Attorneys have also argued that the provision of the Form I-770 Notice of Rights was invalid in some significant manner, such as the reasons highlighted in the ABA Standards, and that these 20 rights were not knowingly waived making the facts obtained during any subsequent interrogation inadmissible for the purposes of establishing grounds of removability. Also, depending on the method of apprehension, particularly in cases of children apprehended in the interior, there may be due process challenges that can be brought based upon an unlawful arrest, search and seizure, or racial profiling.
Inadequate Service of the Notice to Appear (NTA)
An additional due process right specific to children provides that in the case of children under 14 years of age, service of the NTA must be made upon the person with whom the child resides; and, whenever possible, service must also be made on the near relative, guardian, committee, or friend. 23 This provision has been litigated extensively, particularly in cases involving motions to reopen in absentia removal orders.
24
This litigation generally demonstrates that there are important differences amongst the circuit courts regarding what constitutes proper service on a child pursuant to this regulatory provision. The circuit courts do not agree as to what constitutes actual notice of the hearing or the proper person on whom to serve the notice to appear. There are also open issues on proper service when children are in the custody of the Division of Unaccompanied Children's Services (DUCS) and whether service on the specific DUCS facility is sufficient to meet the standards set forth in the regulation.
Admissions of Removability
An additional regulation was implemented in relation to the Immigration and Nationality Act and is meant to protect a child's procedural due process right in the course of the deportation proceeding. 25 This provision addresses a substantive aspect of the deportation hearing by providing that an immigration judge must not accept an admission of removability from an unrepresented child, The immigration judge must then direct a hearing on the issues.
27
Although this regulation has also been extensively litigated creating differences amongst the circuits, generally, the courts do not accept admissions made by children under the age of 14 without any adult present. 28 This provision, however, highlights a perverse anomaly in the development of these procedural due process requirements in that the regulations prohibit an immigration judge from accepting admissions of deportability in court, but allows admissions of deportability given to an arresting officer out-of-court and during interrogation. 
The Right to be Represented by an Attorney
All of these efforts to protect the child's due process rights depend upon an attorney being present to defend the child in the deportation proceeding because the child's ability to raise these due process rights and potential violations is limited. 30 Indeed, the Form I-770 Notice of Rights recognizes this right as one of the three most fundamental rights at the initiation of the deportation proceeding. 31 Currently, the most prevalent form of representation of children in deportation proceedings is through pro bono attorneys or privately retained immigration attorneys. 32 There are two major flaws in this system. First, the pro bono and retained legal services provided to children in deportation proceedings is insufficient as an estimated 60% of children in proceedings still lack di- 26 Id. 27 Id. rect representation. 33 For those children who do obtain counsel, the current level of attention and training on children's individualized needs in the course of the removal proceeding and developmental capacity is limited. 34 Additionally, the federal government has historically taken the position that it cannot be compelled to provide funds for appointed counsel for respondents in removal proceedings. 35 This position, however, does not prohibit the voluntary federal funding of appointed counsel, and, therefore, the possibility of appointed counsel for children and youth in deportation proceedings still exists. Nevertheless, the current system is inadequate to meet the legal representation needs of children. Second, there are no specific ethical practice standards that attorneys representing children in removal proceedings are required to comply with in stark contrast to child welfare and juvenile delinquency proceedings where ethical and practice standards are constantly reviewed and debated. However, the ABA Standards can form the basis for such ethical practice standards. If the child is able to obtain representation in the deportation proceeding, the attorney should be held to the highest standard of zealous advocacy set forth in the ABA Standards.
II. ATTORNEYS AS ZEALOUS ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS: THE RUBRIC OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
What then does zealous advocacy mean for the attorney representing the child in a deportation proceeding? It is without a doubt that protecting the procedural and regulatory due process rights of children, as well as arguing as broadly as possible for existing forms of substantive legal relief for children, both of which are uphill, time and resource-intensive battles, meet the standard of zealous advocacy. Notably, in most training materials and forums for representing children and youth, the use of prosecutorial discretion as a powerful tool to protect immigrant children has simply been ignored. It has been the DREAM Act children and youth activists who have trained and inspired us on the most critical aspect of due process and zealous advocacy: ensuring that there is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful man- 33 Id. at 50. 34 Id. 
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[Vol. 15:189 ner. 37 The reason for this is that DREAM Act activists and youth have been successful in ensuring that DREAM Act factors are explicitly part of prosecutorial discretion guidance and have also supported training for attorneys on how to effectively use prosecutorial discretion to ensure that children and youth are meaningfully heard in the course of the deportation proceeding even in the face of limited forms of substantive legal relief. 38 There is no doubt now that arguing for prosecutorial discretion is also required to meet the standard of zealous advocacy for children and youth in removal proceedings. This pushes the attorney to utilize frameworks for advocacy and negotiating on behalf of children and youth within the immigration system. Zealous advocacy for the right to be heard opens the path to prosecutorial discretion, alternative tools of humanitarian protection for children, and can, for the first time, ensure that the immigration system hears a more complete account of the lives of immigrant children. Requiring the immigration system to confront these children's realities and the real implications of removing them lends additional accountability to the system. Rather than being able to turn a blind eye, the immigration system may finally be forced to confront the harsh reality that deporting children implicates.
A. Lawyering Through to Prosecutorial Discretion
There is little doubt that the fact that children are in deportation proceedings is a better scenario and offers more protections than the alternative of the previous system of nearly immediate "voluntary" departure with no due process. Now that children have won the important right to appear before an immigration judge, the attorney must strive to meet the standard of zealous advocacy for the child, ensure that the child is meaningfully heard in the 37 proceedings, and utilize the full spectrum of possible legal strategies to defend the child in deportation proceedings.
39
The most basic aspect of effective lawyering for children in removal proceedings is to ensure that children are appropriately screened for legal forms of relief with a broad perspective, ranging from Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, Asylum, Withholding of Removal and Convention Against Torture, U Visas, T Visas, VAWA, citizenship and all other possible derivative forms of relief based on these applications or other family or employment based petitions. However, it is with prosecutorial discretion advocacy, as noted, that lawyering takes on its most zealous and difficult form. In order to advocate with this strategy, it is important to have a basic understanding of how prosecutorial discretion has operated historically and possible strategies for the future.
B. A Brief Overview of the History of Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutorial discretion advocacy has re-emerged as a focus of attorney advocacy on behalf of clients because of the most recent release of a memorandum from the Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, John Morton, 40 providing guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the memorandum regarding case-by-case review and guidance from the Principal Legal Advisor, Peter S. Vincent. 41 The principle of discretion first emerged as a necessity in 1940 when administrative discretion to suspend deportation was conferred on immigration authorities. 42 Yet, it was not until the 1970s, in relation to litigation involving the cases of John Lennon and Yoko Ono, that the way in which prosecutorial discretion could be used to grant nonpriority status-also known as deferred action-became publicly known. 43 Deferred action is a prosecutorial discretionary decision not to remove an individual from the United States. While it does not confer legal status, it does allow for the individual to apply for an employment authorization document. ing in immigration court; settling or dismissing a proceeding; granting deferred action, granting parole, or staying a final order of removal; agreeing to voluntary departure, the withdrawal of an application for admission, or other action in lieu of obtaining a formal order of removal; pursuing an appeal; executing a removal order; and responding to or joining in a motion to reopen removal proceedings and to consider joining in a motion to grant relief or a benefit. 51 This list of potential actions is not considered exhaustive. In the case of children in deportation proceedings, some of these actions are critical parts of advocacy and negotiation on behalf of the child. In particular, advocacy for a favorable exercise of discretion that could lead to the grant of some type of lawful status is critically important. For instance, in the case of a difficult asylum claim for a child, the prosecutor exercising discretion not to pursue an appeal can create a favorable environment for the grant of asylum by the immigration judge. Additionally, in the context of asylum, prosecutorial discretion could be exercised to adjourn an asylum decision and allow for the issuance of an employment authorization document. Attorneys can also seek humanitarian parole or deferred action status and request an employment authorization document in the case of children whose removal would lead to separation from their primary caregivers. This is a particularly strong advocacy strategy with children whose parents have Temporary Protected Status (TPS). 52 This could also be an effective strategy in cases where the child has no family to care for them in their country of origin and the child is residing safely with their primary caregiver in the United States.
D. Morton Memo Factors, Vincent Memo Criteria and Guidance Memo Criteria Regarding Children in Deportation Proceedings: Advocating for Expansion into the Best Interests of the Child and Safe Repatriation
In determining whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion, the Morton Memo sets forth several factors that ICE attorneys can consider, with particular care and consideration given to minors and individuals present in the United States since childhood. 53 51 Morton Memo, supra note 38, at 2. 52 Derivative status for children has not yet been favorably adjudicated by USCIS for recently arrived derivative children. There is still a very viable argument that the child can meet all of the requirements for TPS and at least one immigration court has imputed physical presence and residence from the parent with TPS to the child thereby finding the child eligible for TPS. 53 Morton Memo, supra note 38, at 5.
